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NIELSEN v. THE REGENTS:
CHILDREN AS PAWNS OR PERSONS?
By Barbara J. Konkle*
Preface
The degree of enlightenment of any civilization may be measured
in part by its vigilance in protecting the rights of children. The status of
children in the United States has progressed from chattel toward legal
individual through extensive litigation of issues so basic as to have been
protected for adults since the signing of the Constitution. Crusaders for
children's rights have attempted to elicit decisions from the Supreme
Court which recognize that the Constitution does not distinguish funda-
mental freedoms on the basis of age; indeed, that the Constitution recog-
nizes no second-class citizenship.1 Laws designed to deal with the in-
herent differences between people have, in fact, resulted in the continua-
tion of distinctions that constitutional amendments were meant to de-
stroy.2
This note reviews a case currently pending in California, Nielsen v.
The Regents of the University of California.' The case develops a new
area of children's rights in an attempt to establish the principle that the
rights and privileges enumerated in the Constitution and guaranteed to
all persons are violated when children are the subjects of human experi-
mentation with no expectation of personal benefit.'
• Member, third year class.
1. See J. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw (1965).
2. See Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
3. Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. CL, filed Sept. 11, 1973). The complaint was
amended to establish the plaintiffs standing as a taxpayer. The present note is based on
the First Amended Complaint, filed December 19, 1973, and only reviews the First
Cause of Action. The Second Cause of Action challenges another study conducted by the
defendant researcher, that of experimenting upon unconscious persons admitted to a local
emergency hospital.
4. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at First Cause of Action XIX,
XXI, Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 19, 1973).
"Nonbeneficial" as used throughout this note refers to the impact of the treatment
procedure upon the particular research subject rather than implying the treatment is
nonbeneficial per se. However, many medical situations termed nonbeneficial may, at a
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The test case was filed by James Robert Nielsen, an attorney and
specialist in drug law.5 The defendants are the University of California
Regents and the members of the university's Committee on Human
Experimentation. Nielsen, who is a member of that committee, charges
that the use of children as control subjects in experimental research
is unlawful." The charge is based on an experiment proposed by a
University of California Medical Center specialist to research the
developmental processes of allergic diseases. Although the protocol has
been approved by the experimentation committee, use of control sub-
jects is awaiting the outcome of this case. This experiment is but one of
many approved over the years by the committee with Nielsen's vote
recorded as the only dissent.7
The complaint alleges that parents have no right to consent to
their child's participation in experiments which in no way will benefit
the subjects (at least as can be contemplated at the time of consent).
The complaint also alleges undue influence.8
This experiment is a longitudinal study; that is, the subjects will
submit to the procedure every three to six months over a period of five
years. The youngest subjects accepted for participation will be three
months old. Children of families with histories of allergic diseases
comprise the initial subject group. If the study should expand as pro-
future point in time, prove to be beneficial to the subject as a result of information
gathered regarding early detection of disease.
5. Nielsen is on the faculties of the University of California Medical School,
School of Pharmacy and the University of California Hastings College of the Law. He
bases his standing to sue on his taxpayer status and seeks injunctive relief. The chal-
lenged experiment is to be conducted with public funds.
6. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at First Cause of Action IV,
XXVI, Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. CL, filed Dec. 19, 1973).
7. Id. at XXIV.
8. Id. at XXI.




4. Undue influence; or,
5. Mistake."
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1567 (West 1954).
"Undue influence consists:
1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a
real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of
obtaining an unfair advantage over him;
2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or,
3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or
distress."
CAL. Civ. CODE 1575 (West 1954).
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posed and approved by the university, a control group of "normal"
children (those from families with no history of allergic diseases) will be
chosen to constitute a base. The complaint challenges the use of those
control group children.
Nielsen's allegation of undue influence is based on two aspects of
the approved protocol. First, a stipend of $300.00 is offered to the
families of all subjects to absorb the cost of inconvenience and baby-
sitting. That sum is to be paid directly to the subjects' parents. The
complainant alleges that such an offer of money to the prospective
subjects' parents takes advantage of the family's possible economic
distress. It is necessarily a factor in the parents' decision to consent on
behalf of their child. Second, the children contemplated for the control
group are to be chosen largely from the families of the staff and students
at the University of California medical facility. The complainant views
the primary use of those children as an exertion of undue influence over
junior medical personnel by stronger and more powerful senior supervi-
sors. Such an influence would negate any consent by the parents made
on behalf of their children, even if such consent were otherwise lawful.
History
A. Parens Patriae
The concept of children's rights is contemporary. In eighteenth
century English law, it was virtually nonexistent. The right of inheri-
tance was generally recognized; yet, the law made provision for
disinheritance in several specific instances.9 Blackstone, in his commen-
taries on English law, emphasized the duties of children rather than
their rights.10 Such duties were based on a premise of subjection to the
parents and called for obedience during minority, honour and reverence
ever after, protection of the parents in their old age and support when in
need of assistance."
This attitude generally was accepted by the early American
courts' 2 which stressed duties of children to their parents.' 3 Although a
later commentator on American law criticized as barbaric the early
views of children as chattel, the parents' absolute control over their
children was not set aside to make way for rights of children as per-
sons. 4 The law respected the basic integrity of the family and only
recognized a need for state intervention when parents seriously abused
9. See2 W. BLA KsroTN, CommENTARiEs 446-47 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803).
10. Id. at 453.
11. Id.
12. See 2 J. KmT, ComMNTAwwS oN AoMEticAN Lw *207-08 (14th ed. 1896).
13. Id.
14. Id. at *205.
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the absolute control they possessed over their children's lives.' 5 This
recognition took the form of the parens patriae theory."'
An early California case held that a child was not to be regarded as
property but rather as a citizen of the state and as such "peculiarly
under its guardianship and subject to its supervisory control."' Yet, in
the interest of family integrity, courts and legislatures continued their
reluctance to intervene. Their basic assumption seems to have been that
parents by nature act in the best interests of their children.' 8
The parens patriae theory was of prime concern when the first
juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899.19 The Illinois court
recognized a difference between the state's responsibility to adult and to
child offenders.2 0 The court based its theory on the state's concern for
the development of its children as responsible citizens. 2'
All states now have statutes providing for child welfare. 2 The
courts have recognized that neither parents nor the state have an absolute
right of control over a child.23 The orientation of the parens patriae
theory is benevolent. Use of the theory within the court system finds
judges attempting to keep children out of the legal framework with the
thought that any wrongdoing at such a young age probably is due to
environmental factors rather than to an established response to society.2 4
Given the courts' paternal attitude, it is not surprising that few
children's rights cases have been considered of sufficient import to reach
the Supreme Court of the United States. The most significant of the few
decisions to have been litigated before the Court is In re Gault.25 In that
15. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
16. See Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 128 A. 254 (1925); People v.
Wilcox, 22 Barb. 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L.
REV. 104 (1909) [hereinafter cited as The Juvenile Court]. See also Applic. of Pres.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
17. Anthony v. Tarpley, 45 Cal. App. 72, 79, 187 P. 779, 782 (1919).
18. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S, 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
19. The Juvenile Court, supra note 16, at 107. See generally In re Gault, 387 US.
1 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
20. The Juvenile Court, supra note 16, at 107.
21. Id.
22. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 600-02, 625 (West 1972); N.Y. Soc.
WELF. LAW § 395 (McKinney 1966). See People v. Lawrence, 141 Cal. App. 2d 630,
297 P.2d 144 (1956); In the Matter of Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641
(Family CL 1970). But see In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
23. "IThe admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation
to procedural arbitrariness." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). See also
Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947).
24. The Juvenile Court, supra note 16, at 107.
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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case, the Court held that such procedural due process rights as that of
counsel,2 6 adequate notice,27 confrontation and examination,28 and the
privilege against self-incrimination in proceedings which would be
termed criminal if the defendant were adult,29 were applicable to chil-
dren placed in a position to lose their liberty.
Gault was a landmark decision in its recognition of the limitations
of the parens patriae theory and acknowledgment of children's rights.
Since that decision, other rights and freedoms have been made appli-
cable to children by the Court. They include the right to a guarantee
against double jeopardy in a juvenile proceeding; 30 to notice and hearing
prior to suspension from school;31 to voting privileges in national elec-
tions at age eighteen;32 to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile
delinquency adjudicatory hearing; 33 to the First Amendment freedom
of speech and due process; 34 to standing for illegitimate children in
claiming wrongful death benefits on the death of the mother;3 5 to be ad-
vised of constitutional rights prior to questioning;8 6 to discovery aids
prior to waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction;3 7 to counsel in a jurisdic-
tional hearing; 38 to education within a nonsegregated public school sys-
tem;39 and to the First Amendment freedoms of conscience and speech.49
Other cases have limited the application of adult rights to minors.
For example, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania the Supreme Court held that
a child has no right to a jury in a trial which would be termed criminal if
it involved an adult.41
B. Early Experimentation
Although experimental science has been present since 200 A.D.,
case law involving medical experimentation on human subjects. emerged
26. Id. at 41.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 56.
29. Id. at 55.
30. Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
31. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (19,75).
32. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
34. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
35. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
38. Id. at 558.
39. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Brown decided
that black children would suffer psychological harm and thus be denied equal protection
if not guaranteed equal education within the public school system.
40. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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slowly.42 When research problems came to the attention of the law, the
cases usually involved the propriety of consent to therapeutic proce-
dures.43
The first children chosen for use as experimental subjects were
foundlings and orphans. 44 Because nineteenth century infant mortality
rates were so high, scientists felt a great need to study the reasons for
childhood deaths. 45 The subjects of study were quite naturally infants.
Given the predominance of child labor at that time, researchers easily ob-
tained experimental subjects for their studies.46 It was not until 1875 that
an organization was established for the protection of children. Prior to
that time, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was em-
powered by the courts to act in cases of cruelty to children. 7
As technology advanced and research methods became more so-
phisticated,48 medical science became increasingly aware of the long-
range benefits of longitudinal studies.49 Increased research brought with
it an increase in conscience and after 1900 consent to experimental
procedures emerged as an issue. 0
C. Informed Consent
Initially, reports mentioning consent to experimental procedures
42. See generally Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects, 24 SYRAcusE L. R~v. 1067 (1973).
43. E.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (regarding skin graft
between cousins); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961)
(regarding unborn children); Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1871),
rev'd on other grounds 50 N.Y. 696 (1872) (regarding negligent medical treatment);
Slater vi Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (L.B. 1767) (regarding negligent setting of a leg).
44. Mitchell, The Child and Experimental Medicine, in EXPERIMENTATIO vWrrH
HUMAN BENGS 963 (J. Katz ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell].
45. Id. Childhood deaths and diseases require special research. One student of the
problem has written: "Children cannot be regarded simply as 'little people' pharmaco-
logically. Their metabolism, enzymatic and excretory systems, skeletal development and
so forth differ so markedly from adults' that drug tests for the latter provide inadequate
information about dosage, efficacy, toxicity, side effects, and contraindications for chil-
dren." Capron puts forth the suggestion that if children are excluded from the groups
available for research purposes, they may in the end be termed "therapeutic orphans."
Capron, Legal Considerations Affecting Clinical Pharmacological Studies in Children, 21
CL iCAL REsE ,mc 141, 142 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legal Considerations].
46. Mitchell, supra note 44, at 963.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. By observing a child over a number of years, the researcher can see develop-
mental processes at work with full knowledge of all extrinsic factors that may be
contributing to such development. The results take longer to accumulate, but are believed
to be more accurate than piecing together bits of information from a greater number of
individuals, each with peculiar environmental situations which must be considered.
50. Mitchell, supra note 44, at 963-64.
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alluded only to consent obtained from the physician in charge of the
subject patient. Medical journals credited the medical staff with provid-
ing patients for use in experimental procedures. 51
When research developed to the point that persons other than
patients and foundlings were used as experimental subjects, the issue of
consent became important. Experimentation by a physician in the ab-
sence of consent was likely to result in an action for battery 2 or negli-
gence.
53
Informed consent requires capacity, knowledge and voluntari-
ness.54 An infant generally does not have the capacity to consent to
medical procedures.5 5 Therefore, parents or guardians may, in most
instances, consent on behalf of a child. 6 The capacity to consent for
another is based on the assumption that the parents or guardian will act
in the best interests of the child.57 However, the law recognizes that
provision must be made for the failure to act in conformity with that
assumption.55 The knowledge necessary for valid consent to medical
treatment means that the person consenting must have available suffi-
cient information with which to make an informed choice. 59 Voluntari-
ness requires that consent be given without fraud, duress or undue
influence.40
In spite of these sound legal principles which underlie the doctrine
of informed consent, courts have found justification to support parents'
51. Id.
52. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 104 (4th ed. 1971).
53. Id. at 165.
54. See generally Frankel, Medico-Legal Communication, 6 WILLMETrE L.J. 193
(1970); Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FoRDHAM L. REv. 639 (1968).
55. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 102 (4th ed. 1971). See also Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935). The outer limits of the consent issue with respect to
children is examined in the current debate over fetal research. See S.F. Chronicle, Feb.
15, 1975, at 10, cols. 7-8; Studies: Fetal Research, 5 THE HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11
(June, 1975).
56. See People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 (1903); Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed
Consent" in Children, 289 N. ENo. J. MaD. 885 (1973). The strict view of the English
law appears to be that parents cannot consent to nonbeneficial treatment on behalf of
their children. Mitchell, supra note 44, at 974; Curran & Beecher, Experimentation
in Children, 210 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 77, 80-81 (1969). See also Legal Considerations,
supra note 45, at 143.
57. See generally Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects, 24 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1067, 1075 (1973).
58. CAL. PEN. CODE § 273(a) (West 1970); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 260.10 (McKinney
Cam. Supp. 1974).
59. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). See
generally Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Note, Physicians' Use of Exculpatory Provisions in Contracts
Executed with Patients: Tunkl-Belshaw Cases, 6 WILLAMErTE L.J. 341 (1970).
60. See generally W. PROSSER, TopTS 105 (4th ed. 1971).
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decisions to subject their children to nonbeneficial medical procedures
which seriously endanger life. Often the procedure involves the trans-
plant of organs between siblings or twins."- As a rule, courts have held
that a parent is capable of consenting to such a transplant between his or
her children.62 The ill child is expected to benefit from the new organ
and, therefore, the parent's decision to consent is proper. However, that
parent's decision necessarily requires that the healthy child give up an
organ. Courts have justified the validity of parental consent for that
child on a psychological harm basis concluding that the transplant is
proper because, if it were prohibited, and the ill child died, the sibling
who did not give the lifesaving organ would suffer overwhelming
guilt..6
3
Generally, a court will interview the prospective donor to deter-
mine the expectation of psychological harm to the child if not allowed to
donate the organ. Evidence is sought that would render the child
competent to consent to the particular operation. Knowledge of the
procedure and its consequences, and the child's ability to understand
fully the attendant risks are some of the factors considered by the court
in determining the child's competency.64
Even in situations in which medical treatment would benefit the
child, state statutes have recognized that it is sometimes necessary to
intervene when there is a possible discrepancy between parental interest
and the best interest of the child.65 Probably the most publicized cases
are those concerning the question of a parental right to refuse lifesaving
treatment for a child.66 In such cases, the hospital or attending physician
61. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (donation by incompetent to
normal brother); Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 (Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., July 3, 1974)
(bone marrow transplant between siblings). See generally Curran, A Problem of Con-
sent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 891 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as A Problem of Consent].
62. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972). See generally A
Problem of Consent, supra note 61, at 892.
63. According to A Problem of Consent, supra note 61, at 892-93, the three
unreported opinions combined in Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct., June 12, 1957), were based on psychological harm to the well twin resulting from
the court's refusal to accept the donation of his or her organ. The same justification was
used in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), wherein the Court found that
black children would suffer psychological harm if not offered equal education in the
public school system. See generally Mitchell, supra note 44, at 964-72 regarding the court
procedure in deciding transplant cases between minors.
64. See generally A Problem of Consent, supra note 61.
65. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 739, 1755.3 (West 1972); N.Y. FAMILY Cr.
Acr § 232 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1974).
66. E.g., John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). See generally S.F.
Examiner & Chronicle, Nov. 17, 1974, § A, at 6, col. 1.
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frequently refers the case to a court for appointment of a guardian who
will execute the required consent or for the court's intervention sua
sponte.
6 7
There have been cases, however, where court intervention was not
sought and express nonconsent to treatment apparently accepted. 68 One
well-published case involving a refusal of medical treatment occurred at
Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1963.69 The principals were a hospital nurse,
her attorney husband and their premature baby boy. The child was born
with multiple problems: Downs syndrome (mongolism) and a duo-
denal atresia (a blockage of the small intestine). Without surgery the
child could not live because it was impossible for food to pass from the
stomach to the rest of the digestive tract. After considerable thought, the
parents chose the mental and emotional health of their two healthy
children over the life of the newborn. They were not prepared to rear a
severely retarded child, so they instructed the hospital staff to avoid any
extraordinary measures to save the baby's life. The staff respected the
decision of the parents and placed the child in a side room where he
starved to death within two weeks. As far as this author is aware, this
case never resulted in criminal action against the child's parents or the
hospital staff.
D. Diversity of Interests
In deciding cases involving nonbeneficial medical treatment of
children, courts have not implied that the parents exercised their right
to consent in bad faith.70 However, individuals make decisions by calling
upon a panoply of experiences, interests, education and biases which
form their personalities and their personal viewpoints. A parent's deci-
sion to allow his or her child to take part in nonbeneficial experimenta-
tion is also subject to that parent's viewpoint and prejudices. Yet, when
the actual life or health of a child is at issue, every effort should be made
to elicit and consider the child's viewpoint.71 In the complete absence of
capacity to consent as, for example, in the case of a three-month-old
67. See John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971); State v. Perricone, 37 NJ. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
68. See Kelsey, Which Infants ighould Live? Who Should Decide?, 5 Tim HASINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (April 1975). See also Krugman & Giles, Viral Hepatitis - New Light on
an Old Disease, in EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HumAr.rN BEINGS 633 (J. Katz ed. 1972);
Note, Studies vith Children Backed on Medical, Ethical Grounds, in ExPERImENTATIox
wrH HUMAN BEINGs 633 (J. Katz ed. 1972).
69. Lecture by H. Krever, Q.C., University of Toronto, March 18, 1974 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Krever].
70. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Nathan v. Farinelli,
No. 74-87 (Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., July 3, 1974).
71. See generally A Problem of Consent, supra note 61. -
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child, it is customary for an objective third party to represent the child's
interest, particularly when bodily integrity is at issue.72
The Johns Hopkins case referred to above 73 is representative of the
difficult decisions parents must face. Evidence indicated that the par-
ents' decision was aided by opinions solicited from their pastor and
doctors and, therefore, that a variety of considerations were a part of the
final decision.
74
Even if a parent's decision is based on humanitarian motives, the
justification of a child's sacrifice is still questionable. One such case
involved a seven-year-old blind boy who was expected to die within one
year of an inoperable brain tumor.75 The child's mother gave her
consent for the hospital to subject her son to endocrine studies that in no
way could benefit him. The justification offered was that such studies
might possibly aid medical science in detecting brain tumors at an
earlier age. The doctor wrote:
The mother's motives in giving her consent for the studies were
complex. She told the staff that she felt Charles' life would have
been worthwhile if, through the studies, it led to knowledge that
would benefit other children. This statement implied that her con-
sent was partly a way of dealing with Charles' impending death
(although Charles would die, the knowledge gained through him
would live on) and partly a way of compensating for his loss
(Charles would die so that other children might live). However, the
statement also implied the existence of unconscious anger toward
Charles, since it disregarded the severe stress to which the child
would be subjected.
The psychological stress proved to be particularly severe since
the medical procedure heightened the fears commonly experienced
by a child at Charles' developmental stage-concern about body
intactness and manipulation. Frequent venipunctures, necessary
for the research, led to acute panic states in the child.76
72. There is a threshold question in this respect which must be considered. Prior to
the time that a third party would intervene in a decision to allow a child to participate in
human experimentation, a question arises as to how the family reaches the point of
facing a decision to subject that child to experimental procedures. Capron suggests a
selection of fit subjects might be made by those who work with large numbers of
children. Legal Considerations, supra note 45, at 146-47. Nielsen goes further in
suggesting that equality in selection would be achieved only by a national lottery, much
like present selective service procedures.
73. Krever, supra note 69.
74. Id.
75. Lewis, McCollum, Schwartz & Grunt, Informed Consent in Pediatric Research,
in EXPERIMENTATION wri HumAN BEINGs 961 (J. Katz ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Informed Consent in Pediatric Research]. See also Kaplan, Experimentation-An Ar-
ticulation of a New Myth, 46 NEB. L. REv. 87 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Articulation
of a New Myth].
76. Informed Consent in Pediatric Research, supra note 75, at 961; Kaplan sug-
gests that children may be particularly prone to trauma from experimentation simply
because they are children. An undeveloped ego often is unable to withstand external
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The conflict of interest between parent and child has been of
sufficient import in the past to justify the enactment of statutes dealing
specifically with children's problems. In California and other states,
minors may consent, without parental approval, to certain necessary
medical procedures; for example, treatment of pregnancy,77 general
medical care in certain instances78 and communicable diseases. 79 Courts
and legislatures, in interpreting such statutes, have based their decisions
on such constitutional considerations as the right to privacy. 0 When a
situation could be termed life or death, as in Nielsen, the use of
guidelines and perhaps state intervention would be necessary to protect
the child's interests.
The International Response
Interest in medical research grew so rapidly after 1900 that abuse
was inevitable.8 ' Specific guidelines were not drafted to protect human
subjects and their dignity in experimentation until public outcry arose
over the World War II atrocities which were litigated at Nuremberg. 2
Prior to that time, it appears that the accepted guidelines were of a gen-
eral medical nature, such as those set forth in the Oath of Hippocrates. 83
That oath emphasized broad humanitarian goals rather than enumerat-
ing specific requirements for responsible experimentation. 4
During the Nuremberg Trials twenty-five "dedicated and honored
medical men!" 5 were accused of committing war crimes against involun-
tary human subjects.8 6 The investigations for which they were prosecut-
pressure, even allowing for sufficient insight in the case of a mature child. Such fanta-
sies or fears as a child may experience as part of the developmental process would,
therefore, be accentuated, or at least brought into conscious thought, through participa-
tion in experimental procedures. One must then question the justification when the out-
come is not expected to be of any particular benefit to that child. Articulation of a New
Myth, supra note 75, at 105.
77. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); In
re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals 1972); CAL.
Crv. CoDE § 34.5 (West 1954).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE - 34.6 (West Supp. 1975). See also S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 20,
1975, at 2, col. 6, wherein it was reported that California Governor Jerry Brown recently
signed a bill which will permit girls under eighteen years of age to obtain contraceptive
devices without parental permission.
79. CAL. Civ. CODE § 34.7 (West Supp. 1975).
80. In re PJ., No. 922976 (D.C. Super. Ct., Feb. 6, 1973).
81. Veressayev, The Memoirs of a Physician, in EXPERIMENTATION wrTH HUMAN
BmNGs 284-91 (J. Katz ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Veressayev].
'2. See generally Nuernberg Military Tribunals, United States 'v. Brandt, 1-2
TRIALs oF WAR CRMINALs BFnoRE TE NuERNBERG MLrrARY TRmuNALS (1950).
83. 2 id. at 82-86.
84. Veressayev, supra note 81, at 311.
85. Articulation of a New Myth, supra note 75, at 87.
86. Not all defendants were found guilty. Nuernberg Military Tribunals, United
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ed included, inter alia, researching the limits of human endurance and
existence at extremely high altitudes and in freezing temperatures, the
contraction and treatment of malaria, epidemic jaundice and spotted
fever, and the human response to various poisons.8 7 The triers of fact in
that case were not swayed by the "advance of medical knowledge"
defense argument."' Although certain human responses were discov-
ered as a result of the research, little information proved useful to the
world of civilized medicine.
8 9
Apparently, only such dramatic situations as those exposed at
Nuremberg could shock the public sufficiently to prompt the drafting of
specific guidelines for medical research. A portion of the opinion
set up requirements for responsible experimentation, formally called
the Nuremberg Code.90 The code was compiled by the United
States Military Tribunal which operated under American procedural
rules and was comprised primarily of American jurists.0 ' It was consid-
ered to be the most forceful formulation of ethical rules of conduct de-
veloped to that date and was specifically drawn to regulate human ex-
perimentation.0 2
The Declaration of Helsinki93 was formulated by the World Medi-
cal Association in the 1960's amidst criticism of the Nuremberg Code.
Researchers had complained that the Nuremberg Code "separated right
from wrong more easily than can be done with the nuances of modem
research."94  By 1967, numerous well-known and highly regarded
American professional medical organizations had adopted the Declara-
tion of Helsinki as their standard of research.98
States v. Brandt, 2 TRIAS OF WAR CImINALS BaFoRw Tnr NumaLNBEGo MIrrARY TRI-
BUrNALS 171-301 (1950).
87. 1 id. at 92-738.
88. The defense argument was based on the necessity of advancing medical
knowledge claimed to have arisen out of the wartime and emergency situations. 2 id. at
5-12.
89. The Opening Statement of the Prosecution by Brigadier General Telford
Taylor, 1 id. at 73, indicated that researchers found that phenol or gasoline injected
intravenously will kill a man inexpensively within sixty seconds.
90. 2 id. at 181-84.
91. The tribunal was composed of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of
Washington, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of Florida, a former justice of the
district court of Oklahoma and a former special assistant to the attorney general of the
United States. I id. at 5, 24-26.
92. Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24
SYRACUSE L. Rv. 1067, 1078 (1973).
93. Veressayev, supra note 81, at 312-13.
94. Editorial, The Ethics of Human Experimentation, 270 N. ENG. I. MED). 1014
(1964).
95. These included, inter alia, the American Medical Association, the American
Federation for Clinical Research, the Central Society for Clinical Research, the American
College of Physicians, the American College of Surgeons, the Society for Pediatric Re-
[Vol. 2
NIELSEN v. THE REGENTS
The principles espoused by the two codes are identical. However,
the Helsinki Declaration, designed especially for the researcher's guid-
ance, is much more detailed than the Nuremberg Code. The declaration
encourages the use of guidelines in the field of research while acknowl-
edging the importance to the world of the need to advance medical
knowledge.
The codes speak, inter alia, to the necessity of a voluntary consent
to experimentation free of coercion or fraud; to researching other meth-
ods which yield the same expected results before resorting to experimen-
tation on humans; to avoiding unnecessary suffering and injury; to a
balancing of risk with results expected to be gained from the experimen-
tation; to the necessity of proper safeguards and of providing an oppor-
tunity for the subject to withdraw from the experiment at any time.
Even with the acceptance of these codes, abuses continue to occur9 6
and other guidelines constantly are being devised. 97 The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare issued a policy statement which was
adopted by the University of California Medical School on March 29,
1972, and which governs the protocol challenged in Nielsen.9"
Children as Legal Entities
The dignity of the individual, so cherished by modem civilization,
has been dealt with extensively by western philosophers." Yet, even the
search and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 1079 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d
338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965), rev'd 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818, rev'd per
curiam, 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See also New York State
Assoc. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (1973); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387, modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(1972). The first Wyatt case was filed on behalf of all mentally ill persons in the state
of Alabama alleging inhumane treatment and deprivation of constitutional rights. By a
motion to amend, the class was expanded to include all mentally retarded persons in the
state. The two companion cases were published separately. See generally Legal Considera-
tions, supra note 45.
97. The experiment in question is subject to the guidelines set out by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, 38 Fed. Reg. 27882 (1973).
98. Id. See Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (1966). Prior to 1962,
the Food and Drag Administration had set only lax standards for use of investigational
drugs. The thalidomide babies revealed the inadequacies of those standards and led to the
Kefauver-Harris amendment to the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, placing more emphasis
on responsible testing of drugs prior to their being put on the market. Legal Considera-
tions, supra note 45, at 142. See also Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F.
Super. Ct., filed Sept. 11, 1973); Schreiner, Liability in Use of Investigational Drugs,
185 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 259 (1963); Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RTGERnS L. REv. 947 (1964).
99. See, e.g., "Every man is to be respected as an absolute end in himself, and it
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basic proposition that the word "persons" in the United States Constitu-
tion also means "children" has required judicial recognition. Court opin-
ions discussing constitutional guarantees of the rights of minors have
generally been limited to a discussion of the particular constitutional
guarantee in question.1 0
In re Gault'0' discussed the applicability of the Constitution to
children. Justice Fortas wrote for the majority:
[WIhile these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject,
they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise
impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone.' 02
Although the meaning of Justice Fortas' statement seems clear, later
cases concerning minors' constitutional rights have limited the opinions
to the problem litigated.
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,' the United States
Supreme Court reversed a federal district court decision which had
sustained a school regulation prohibiting public school students from
protesting the government's policy in Vietnam by wearing black arm-
bands to school. The Court noted that the right of free speech was not
limited to adults:
Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to ,the State.' 04
The majority in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,0 5 discussing the consti-
tutional right of trial by jury in criminal cases, however, held that such a
right was not applicable to children who had committed an act which
would be a crime if committed by an adult. The majority was of the
opinion that separation of juvenile and criminal systems should continue
despite obvious shortcomings.' 06 Therefore, they declined to adopt the
is a crime against the dignity that belongs to him as a human being to use him as a mere
means for some external purpose .... " F. PAULSEN, IMMANUEL KANT, His LiFE AND
DocruNE 339-40 (1963).
100. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1971).
101. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
102. Id. at 13.
103. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
104. Id. at 511.
105. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
106. The Court stated:
"The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are
particularly reluctant to say, as do the Pennsylvania appellants here, that the system
cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on the availability of
resources, on the interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on
understanding as to cause and effect and cure." Id. at 547.
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argument that all constitutional guarantees are applicable to children. In
so holding, they followed opinions issued in six prior children's rights
cases.
107
Justice Douglas, disagreeing with the majority in McKeiver,
argued:
The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury provided
in the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States, speaks of denial
of rights to "any person," not denial of rights to "any adult per-
son . . 108
Justice Douglas did not disregard the differences between adults and
children. However, he felt those differences should be considered in a
juvenile case without denying constitutional protections. 10 9 Douglas
thought that McKeiver could be tried by jury without denying him the
benefits of a parens patriae focus.
Justice Douglas also dissented in part in Wisconsin v. Yoder."l0 In
that case he concluded that the freedom of religion protected by the
Constitution encompassed the freedom of the Amish child to practice a
religion, rather than solely the right of the parents to bring up their
children in their own religion. The majority had addressed itself only to
the interests of the state in relation to the interests of the Amish
parents."
l
It is noteworthy that all of the above situations involve basic adult
freedoms which have required decisions by the highest court in the land
before they were applied to children.
Extension of Certain Constitutional
Rights to Children
A. Due Process Considerations
The rights to life and liberty are guaranteed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The court in People v. Gillson
107. Prior children's rights cases following the parens patriae theory included: In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
108. 403 U.S. 528, 560 (1971).
109. Justice Douglas stated: "[Wihere a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to
prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to order 'confinement' until the child reaches
21 years of age or where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect,
then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult." Id. at 559.
110. 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at213-14.
112. 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
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easily found the concept of bodily integrity to be within the definition of
due process:
The term "liberty," as used in the constitution, is not dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints
as are necessary for the common welfare.118
Nielsen alleges that the experimental procedures involved might
result in serious injury or death."" The procedure involves injections of
epinephrine, a drug often used in treatment of allergy patients. Its side
effects are well-known. Two researchers studying the use of epinephrine
in children wrote:
Every allergist knows that epinephrine may occasionally cause
disturbing symptoms.... [W]hen we use sympathomimetic drugs
for asthma we "buy the whole package." We must expect to en-
counter certain undesirable cardiovascular side effects. These
include dizziness, tremor, pallor, and palpitation." 5
Any injection may cause side effects which should not be disregarded
without justification. There is always the risk of venipuncture and
infection, a hematoma at the puncture site or, where there is an undi-
agnosed aneurysm, a thrombosis and resulting stroke.1 6 The possibility
of death, albeit remote, is also present."17
113. 109 N.Y. 389, 398-99, 17 N.E. 343, 345 (1888).
114. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at First Cause of Action XVI,
Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 19, 1973).
Complainant Nielsen relies on California Penal Code § 273(a) which makes it a
misdemeanor to unjustifiably cause or permit the infliction of physical pain or mental
suffering upon a child or consent to such an unjustifiable act. The statute is relevant to
to the issue of a violation of the due process rights of the control group children through
the following reasoning process. If the conduct is illegal because of a legislative
determination that it is unhumane, it is also unconstitutional and invades the guarantee
of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment See also N.Y. PEN. LLW § 260.10 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1974). Further support for the argument that there has been an abuse of
right is CAL. Cxv. CODE § 3513 (West 1970) which provides: "Any one may waive the
advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement." In Friedman v. Pacific Outdoor
Adv. Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 946, 952-53, 170 P.2d 67, 71 (1946), the court held the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria not applicable when the injury arises from the violation
of a municipal ordinance.
115. Speer & Tapay, Syncope in Children Following Epinephrine, 28 ANNALS OF
ALLERGY 50 (1970). Syncope means fainting.
116. See generally THE MancK MNUAL or DAGNOsIs AND THERAPY 1729 (C.
Lyght, M.D. ed. 1956); Lecks, Wood & Donsky, The metabolic, circulatory, and bron-
chomotor responses of asthmatic children to epinephrine infusion, 44 J. oF ALLERGY
261 (1969).
117. Ten percent of all pulmonary aneurysms are asymptomatic. J. Yoznx, R. RowE,
& P. VLAD, HEART DIsEAsE IN INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 889 (2d ed. 1967). The injection
of epinephrine usually results in a temporary increase in the blood pressure. If a child
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It is impossible to predict the reaction of any child, or adult, to the
injection of an experimental drug. Furthermore, current standards of
research which require the termination of a project upon any indication
of injury or harm or upon request of the subject are not sufficient in
most longitudinal studies such as that challenged in Nielsen. Normally,
longitudinal studies look to the gradual development of symptoms re-
lated to the particular syndrome studied. They usually require children as
subjects. In Nielsen the youngest subjects contemplated are only three
months old, and the plan is to continue the studies of allergic reactions
for a period of five years. An infant would have considerable difficulty
in communicating to the researcher a wish to terminate the experiment
or discomfort resulting from the injection. Although such a young child
always has available the aid of vocal protest, it would be almost impos-
sible to determine what, specifically, was the basis for the outburst. If a
child cannot speak out and request termination of the experiment, it
would appear that the guidelines provide inadequate protection.
This experiment involves significant risks to life and health due to
unknown effects of an injection. Since experimental guidelines are inef-
fective to protect those children who cannot express a wish to terminate
the procedures, the due process rights of those control children are
violated.
No doubt, the argument will be raised that parental consent would
operate as a waiver of the due process rights of the children generally.
As noted above, however, the university may be unfairly taking advan-
tage of parents' conflicting interests in order to obtain a control group
of healthy children.118 Nielsen alleges that the offer of money to the
prospective subjects' parents takes advantage of the family's possible
economic distress. The primary use of children from families of the staff
and students at the medical facility is challenged as an exertion of undue
influence over junior medical personnel. If Nielsen succeeds in establish-
ing that any consent given by the prospective subjects' parents is inher-
ently invalid, the experiment could not proceed with a control group. If
the allegation is not proved, it would still seem incumbent upon the
court to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to
take advantage of the legal fiction of parental consent in order to
perform nonbeneficial experimentation on healthy children. Therefore,
whether considering only the children unable to speak for themselves or
had an undiagnosed aneurysm and the injection of the drug caused an increase in blood
pressure, it is conceivable that the blood vessel might burst and that it would result in the
child's death. See also Burns & Manion, Sudden Unexpected Death of a Two-year-old
Child from Thrombosis of Both Coronary Arteries with Aneurysmal Dilatation of the
Vessels, 38 MED. ANNALS OF THE DIsT. OF COLUM. 381 (1969); Rebhun, Pulmonary
Embolism in Asthmatics, 28 ANNALS OF ALLERGY 586 (1970).
118. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
Fall 19751 NIELSEN v. THE REGENTS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
all of the healthy control group children, Nielsen is seeking to prove an
unconstitutional deprivation of rights.
B. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, "to be let alone,"" 9 is one of the most
comprehensive and important of our constitutional freedoms.
[T]he protection of a person's general right ,to privacy-his right
to be let alone by other people-is, like -the protection of his
property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individ-
ual States.12
0
Although the right to privacy is not expressly set forth in the
United States Constitution, 121 courts have recognized certain zones of
privacy under the Constitution. These include the right to procreate,
12
to contraception,12 3 to child rearing and education 24 and to terminate
pregnancy.
125
As stated previously, case law in certain instances has regarded
children as persons under the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion.' 26 It should follow, then, that children, like adults, are entitled to
the implied constitutional right to privacy.1
2 7
In Huguez v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the body was deserving of protection from unwarranted intru-
sions. The court stated:
[The intimate internal areas of the physical habitation of mind
and soul [are not] any less deserving of precious preservation from
unwarranted and -forcible intrusions than are the intimate internal
areas of the physical habitation of wife and family. Is not the
119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). See generally Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Ray. 193 (1890).
120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
121. Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965),
spoke of penumbral rights-those not specifically stated in the Constitution but nonethe-
less protected from governmental intrusion.
122. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
123. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
124. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 143 (1973).
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
127. In re P.J., No. 922976 (D.C. Super. Ct., Feb. 6, 1973). See also Salaices v.
Superior Ct., 1 Civil 36088 (First App. Dist., Dec. 11, 1974). A Petition for Prohibition
was filed seeking recognition of the wishes of three children whose parents had been
divorced. The petition asserted the children's right to privacy in not wanting to comply
with parental visitation rights set out in the judgment of dissolution. The appellate court
denied the petition and the California Supreme Court denied a rehearing. Such cases
signal an awakening to the rights of children separate and apart from those of their
parents.
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sanctity of the body even more important, and, therefore, more to
be honored in its protection than the sancity of the home . . . ?128
The use of drugs as, for example, the injection challenged in Niel-
sen, is an intrusion into the body. As medical science advances and ac-
cepted medical and surgical procedures are either abandoned as too dras-
tic or sanctioned only as last resort measures, 12 9 the medical profession is
expanding its use of drugs. 3 '
Senator Sam Ervin recently wrote in a report issued by his Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights that use of mind-altering drugs is so
potentially threatening to our basic freedoms that the government seri-
ously should question their use at all. 31
Although we are somewhat protected from the general misuse of
drugs by enforced safety standards, 3 2 typical testing situations, usually
including a normal or control group in order to get a base reaction,
constitute an unwarranted invasion for some subjects. As in Nielsen,
where no personal benefit is contemplated for those in the control
group, the privacy issue cannot be ignored. If integrity of the mind and
body are to be preserved, such an intrusion into the body by injection
would constitute a denial of the constitutional right to privacy of those
children.
C. Tangential Equal Protection Considerations
Inclusion of the contemplated control group in Nielsen suggests not
only an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy
but also raises related questions with respect to a violation of equal
protection.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution demands that
equal protection of the laws be extended to all persons similarly situat-
ed." 3 Traditionally, courts have given broad discretion to state legisla-
128. 406 F.2d 366, 382 n.84 (9th Cir. 1968), rehearing en banc denied (Feb. 12,
1969).
129. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 13 Crim. L. Rep. 2452
(Mich. 1973).
130. See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). Drugs have been
used quite extensively in calming hyperkinetic children. Researchers are now investigat-
ing the causes of hyperactivity rather than merely masking its symptoms. It has been too
easy to prescribe mind-affecting drugs to help a child "adjust." See Divoky, Toward a
Nation of Sedated Children, LEARNiNG, March 1973, at 37; Keogh, Hyperactivity and
Learning Disorders: Review and Speculation, EXCEPnTONAL CmLDREN, Oct. 1971, at 101.
See also Wyatt v. Stickney companion cases, 344 F. Supp. 373, modified sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387, modified sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (1972).
131. S.F. Examiner, Dec. 1, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
132. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (1972).
133. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942). See also Tussman & ten-
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tors to enact statutes utilizing classifications reasonably related to per-
missible state objectives.' 314 However, when the classification infringes
on a fundamental constitutional right or on the rights of a "suspect
class,"'1  a "compelling state interest" test is applied.1"'- Under this test,
a necessary relation between the state interest and the classification must
be shown.
Arguably, the compelling state interest test could be applied in this
case both because the classification of children contains certain of the
indicia which have made other classifications suspect (race137 and alien-
age'8 8) and because the right to privacy is a fundamental right within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment protections.1
3 9
Hillary Rodham, a leading advocate for children's rights, has ex-
amined the changing status of children under the law140 and advanced
the proposition that the general class of children should be considered
suspect, thus triggering the compelling state interest test:
The strictures of the new equal protection theory should apply to
children, i.e., classifications of children qua children, or of certain
classes of children, should be considered suspect, and needs which
from a developmental standpoint are fundamental should be pro-
tected as fundamental interests under the Constitution.'
4'
The basis for this proposition is that age classifications involve
arbitrary notions of capacity which are easily disproved in either individ-
ual or group experiences.' 42 Additionally, children are a discrete minori-
ty, powerless to protect their own interests through the political process-
es.'
48
The control group children in Nielsen represent a minority without
political standing. Unlike children from families with a history of aller-
gic diseases, the healthy children in the control group stand to gain no
personal benefit from the experiment. Also, unlike healthy adults who
might choose to subject themselves to medical experiments, for instance
prisoners, the control group children have no recognized right to weigh
personal risks against humanitarian contributions before giving consent.
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (194q).
134. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897).
135. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
136. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See also id. at 658-62 (dis-
cussion of "compelling interest" doctrine by Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
139. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
140. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HAv. EDuc. REv. 487 (1973).
141. Id. at 507.
142. Id. at 512.
143. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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It is doubtful that finding a cure for allergies and advancing
medical science would satisfy the rigorous scrutiny of the compelling
state interest test. Even if such reasons satisfied the test, it would seem
that where less drastic alternatives could lead to the same end, the use of
healthy children would be unnecessary.
144
At the very least, the university appears to be taking unfair advan-
tage of one small and powerless group, subjecting them to the risk of
physical harm and to invasion of their privacy simply because their
parents, perhaps out of a conflict of interest, have given consent. Use of
the legal fiction of parental consent to the disadvantage of the child
shocks the conscience. The Constitution requires more.
Conclusion
The foregoing medical and constitutional considerations have been
advanced to illustrate the need for an ethical and legal scheme for
continuing necessary research on children while preserving the dignity
and integrity of the individual.
Suggestions for resolution of the problem are numerous. They
include auto-experimentation,' 45 refusal to publicize results of experi-
ments acquired through unethical practices,
14 6 use of ombudsmen, 47
provision for significant compensation of injured subjects'48 and the
requirement of a review board to authorize all experiments.' 49
144. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HIv. L Rnv. 1
(1972) wherein Professor Gunther discusses a means versus ends approach to equal
protection.
145. Altman, Auto-Experimentation-An Unappreciated Tradition in Medical Sci-
ence, 286 NEw ENG. J. MED. 346 (1972). In an interview with Science magazine,
Chester Southam, director of the cancer research team at Sloan-Kettering Institute for
Cancer Research, was asked his opinion on auto-experimentation. Southam was being
questioned on the Institute's practice of injecting human beings with live cancer cells to
study human immunity to cancer. Southam answered, "I would not have hesitated . ..
if it would have served a useful purpose. But... to me it seemed like false heroism,
like the old question whether the General should march behind or in front of his troops.
I do not regard myself as indispensable-if I were not doing this work someone else
would be-and I did not regard the experiment as dangerous. But, let's face it, there
are relatively few skilled cancer researchers, and it seemed stupid to take even the little
risk." Southam preferred to rely on a group of volunteers at the Ohio State Peniten-
tiary. Human Experimentation: Cancer Studies at Sloan-Kettering Stir Public Debate
on Medical Ethics, 143 SCIENCE 551 (1964).
146. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 N. ENO. J. MED. 1354, 1360
(1966).
147. Cooper, Creative Pluralism-Medical Ombudsman, in ExPmumrNTAiTio wr
HumAN BEINGs 991 (1. Katz ed. 1972) thereinafter cited as Cooper].
148. Havighurst, Compensating Persons Injured in Human Experimentation, 169
SCImNCE 153 (1970).
149. Melmon, Grossman & Morris, Emerging Assets and Liabilities of a Committee
on Human Welfare and Experimentation, 282 N. ENG. J. MFD. 427 (1970) (hereinafter
cited as Emerging Assets].
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The recommendation most frequently followed has been that of a
review board. The project challenged by Nielsen is funded by a grant
from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and, as such, is
subject to its guidelines,5 0 which are similar to those of the Nuremberg
Code 51 and the Declaration of Helsinki.'5 2 In an attempt to carry out
responsible research, since 1966 the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare has required a Human Experimentation Committee to
review proposed protocols, to make recommendations and ultimately to
approve or disapprove the projects. 5 ' Such a committee is active on the
University of California Medical School campus reviewing all protocols,
whether or not subject to funding.15 4 This committee approved the
experiment in question. The University of California policy with regard
to consideration of the proposed protocols is quite elaborate. Committee
members represent diverse medical fields on the school campus. The
group's only attorney in the past few years has been the plaintiff
Nielsen. 55
A possible solution to the dilemma is that the peer group review
committee be replaced by a committee composed of or including repre-
sentatives from the lay community. Lay community representation would
aid the committee in ridding itself of its inevitable self-serving attitude.
Quite naturally, university doctors and scientists on the committee are
influenced, though perhaps indirectly, by the favorable publicity likely
to flow from a successful experiment.
There are obvious obstacles to implementing such a solution. The
committee at the University of California now uses ad hoc committees
within specific areas of expertise to facilitate turnover of the highly
scientific protocols they are called upon to evaluate. A committee
representative from the lay community would require countless hours
of medical background preparation to be in a position to rule on a partic-
ular protocol. If the objective of a review committee is to provide
an evaluation by persons disinterested in the outcome of the experiment,
the increased evaluation time might prove advantageous. The addition of
one lay member has not changed the outcome of -the vote in the years
Nielsen has been a member of the committee. Perhaps more lay members
are needed to tip the scale toward greater consideration of the patient
subject's needs and rights.
150. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
153. See Emerging Assets, supra note 149, at 427.
154. Id.
155. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at First Cause of Action IV,
Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 19, 1973).
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This author views the concept of a. review board as a positive
approach, but including peers who have even an indirect interest in the
outcome of the research defeats the entire purpose of a board intended
to evaluate and criticize procedures. While the most acceptable solution
would be to discontinue all nonbeneficial research on children, it is
unlikely that such a step would ever be taken or, indeed, that it would be
followed even if judicially decreed. Researchers have acknowledged the
need for an alternative to the questionable use of children, incompetents
and prisoners as subjects. 156 The study challenged in Nielsen would sim-
ply demand the use of a greater number of children from families with a
history of allergic diseases. Receiving the information as a by-product
of therapeutic treatment certainly would require more time before medi-
cal conclusions could be reached, but the procedure would pose fewer
legal problems. 157
Absent such a voluntary move by researchers, a possible solution to
the problem of preserving the infant subjects' constitutional rights might
lie in judicial intervention, with a weighing of the risks and benefits
anticipated as a result of a study.
One scientist concerned with the ethical problems of human experi-
mentation has argued:
Any one solution, such as some independent ombudsman or office
of review in the executive or legislative branches, would be in-
sufficient. Rather, we need a return to old-fashioned scientific
pluralism. We need open, constructive conflict of ideas from which
truth may emerge. We should not discourage advocacy, dissidence,
and special pleading. One approach is to dilute the concentration
of advisory sources. The same people or program sources should not
at once guide legislative and executive branches, from within and
wihout, while also dominating voluntary and professional society
channels. Let us round out our pluralisms and ait least occasionally
have some spirited debates over -both ends and means, right out
in the open.1
58
156. See Legal Considerations, supra note 45, at 145-46.
157. "In our haste to win the medical wars-society's haste-and to enjoy promised
fruits of conquest, we are adventuring beyond prudent limits of risk. The hope becomes
the theory which leads to selective discovery of evidence to support the wish, while
contrary evidence which might slow the pace is ignored or rationalized away. This
naturally stems from single-minded advocacy which sometimes has led to great gains, but
more often has blocked or retarded action along other avenues of progress.
What is wrong is the absence of mechanisms for obliging proponents of action to
offer evidence, in reasonable depth, to independent judges who do not have causes to
espouse. Consequently, it has been too easy for bold new programs in the medical sector
to come into being without scientific bases for promises or hope that benefits could or
would materialize. Once activated these new programs become irreversibly committed
because of public promises, dependence of program personnel or continuity of support,
and force of legislation." Cooper, supra note 147, at 987.
158. Id. at 991.
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Such an independent and unbiased viewpoint presently is utilized in
cases involving child neglect'59 or consent to minor marriages. 6 ' It
seems a small and yet constitutionally required step to expand.utilization
of a third party viewpoint to embrace the field of nonbeneficial experi-
mentation on children. While implementation of this suggestion might
seem an overwhelmingly large task, adoption of other recommendations
advanced would reduce the number, of situations requiring judicial
review.
For instance, Hillary Rodham has suggested three different strate-
gies to further recognition of legal rights for children.' 6' They include:
(1) abolishing the legal status of infancy or minority to the extent of
reversing the presumption of incompetency; (2) application of all pro-
cedural rights now guaranteed to adults under the Constitution to
children whenever the state or a third party moves against them, judi-
cially or administratively; and (3) rejection of the presumption of
identity of interests between parents and their children whenever the
child has interests demonstrably independent of those of his or her
parents with an opportunity for the competent child to assert his or her
own interests.loa
The suggestions are not new. The Restatement of Torts for many
years has encouraged abolishing rigid age standards for determination of
competency. 6 3 Likewise, Justice Douglas, although dissenting in Wis-
consin v. Yoder,'" affirmed the majority decision with respect to one of
the children based on a consideration of that child's testimony and
obvious competency.'1
5
Abolition of the parens patriae theory is not necessarily required if
children are given all adult rights. The Juvenile Court movement was
designed to approach a child's problems paternalistically rather than to
determine guilt or innocence. However, it would be difficult to accept
the view that the framers of the movement, in establishing a benevolent
approach to rehabilitation of children, meant to deny to those same
children the constitutional rights which are guaranteed to all persons.1 66
In the field of experimentation, the state could retain an interest in the
physical and mental growth of its children without wielding so much
power as to deny those children their constitutional rights.
159. See CAL. WEU.. & INSrTNS CODE §§ 600-02, 625 (West 1972); N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW §§ 385, 397 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc. WE.LF. LAw § 395
(McKinney 1966).
160. See CA.. Civ. Cona § 4102 (West 1973).
161. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDuc. REv. 487 (1973).
162. Id. at 506-07.
163. REsTATEmENT op ToRTs § 59 (1934).
164. 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972).
165. Id. at 242-43.
166. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
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As to the identity of interests, Rodham suggests that the only way
to rid the courts of the problem of presumptions is to resort to extrafam-
ilial decisions, taking into account all interested parties. The courts now
treat such an identity of interests as to the parent and child as a legal
presumption or at least a permissible presumption.16 7 Ideally, it should
be treated only as an assumption to be discarded where consequences
based on that assumption appear to be irreversible.1
68
Nielsen v. The Regents'"9 as a test case could have far-reaching
ramifications in casting yet another vote for children's rights. Just as
courts heretofore have held in specific instances that the United States
Constitution is applicable to children, it is time a general statement be
advanced to guarantee for children the full range of protections guaran-
teed to all persons under the United States Constitution. The instant case
is a prime example of the abuse that up to now has been visited upon
children simply due to their legal incapacity-a justification for wide-
ranging abuse that should not be allowed to continue. One judicial
decree alone will not solve the problems of nonbeneficial experimenta-
tion on children. The time has come for legislation and specific legal
guidelines outlining the rights of children. It well may be that research-
ers will have to discontinue research on those incompetent to give their
informed consent. Whatever the outcome, automatically allowing
parents to consent to such experimentation on their children denies
those children their constitutional rights. In the words of Earl Warren:
"A little freedom for some people will no longer suffice."' 17
Children are one of our most precious national resources. If we are
to preserve that resource, the protection extended must be real not
ilusionary.' 7 '
167. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HAv. EDuc. REv. 487, 510 (1973).
168. Id.
169. Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 11, 1973).
170. Warren, "All Men are Created Equal," 25 RECORD 351, 355-56 (1970).
171. Since this note was written, the plaintiff in Nielsen moved for a summary
judgment on the First Cause of Action. The facts are not in dispute, although they are
viewed quite differently by the opposing parties. The following statements illustrate
the defendants' position:
"I believe we all have obligations to one another and to society which some will
choose to express by charitable contributions, volunteer work, etc. Another opportunity,
another way to make a social contribution is to participate and to permit the participa-
tion of one's children in investigations which represent significant opportunities for help-
fulness and minimal opportunities for harm. I believe that many parents directly feel
that this is a good thing to do for mankind: they can be at peace with their own con-
sciences in placing their children in that small degree of jeopardy given the substantial
nature of the benefits that might accrue to children in particular, and adults too." Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction for Defendants, Exhibit "C" at
5, lines 26-32, Nielsen v. The Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (S.F. Super. CL, filed Dec. 19,
1973).
"It is perhaps reasonable to expect that people have to contribute to the society
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Parents 'may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow -they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for them-
selves. 17
2
in which they live. All privileges tend to be associated with responsibility and the fact
that small children are unaware of this does not mean they do not fall subject to the
same rule of nature." Points and Authorities in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction
for Defendants, Exhibit "B" at 10, lines 16-20, Nielsen, supra.
172. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964) (regarding protection of the unborn child).
